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The Virtue of Gratitude and  






 It is common and natural to conceptualize gratitude as a virtuous character trait a person 
might possess. On one plausible understanding of character traits, a grateful person is one who is 
consistently disposed to respond with the proper degree of grateful behavior and feelings in 
situations that call for gratitude, and one person is more grateful than another when the former is 
disposed to come closer to this ideal degree than the latter. When people think of the virtue of 
gratitude in this way, they typically think of one vice associated with it—ingratitude—which is 
understood as a shortfall in certain grateful feelings and behaviors vis-à-vis those which a 
situation calls for. This understanding of gratitude as a virtue and ingratitude as its sole associated 
vice has two implications: 1) that there is a scale along which gratitude as a character trait can be 
quantified, and 2) that falling short along this scale, when gratitude is called for, is the only way a 
person can fail to be properly or virtuously grateful. I believe the first implication is misleadingly 
simplistic, and the second implication is patently false. My goal in this chapter is to show why 
those implications are mistaken by developing an account of the virtue of gratitude that reveals 
the rich variety of ways a person can fail to be properly grateful.  
In the first two sections I sketch an account of response-gratitude: what it means for a 
beneficiary to be grateful to his benefactor in response to a particular act of benevolence she 
performs.1 I argue that for a beneficiary to be grateful to a benefactor for an act of benevolence is 
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essentially for the beneficiary to be disposed to think, feel and behave in certain ways concerning 
his benefactor, and so response-gratitude is properly understood as a complex of cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral dispositions. In the third section, I define the virtue of gratitude as the 
general disposition to form these particular dispositions toward the right (and only the right) 
benefactors at the right times to the right degrees. With this account of the virtue of gratitude on 
the table, in the fourth section I turn to an exploration of the ways a person can fail to possess this 
virtue, and I articulate the senses in which those failures can constitute vices—morally bad 
character traits. My analysis will reveal a surprising richness in the kinds of vices constituted by 
tendencies to respond improperly to benevolence or apparent benevolence. I conclude, in the 
fifth section, by suggesting several implications this richness in gratitude-associated vices has for 
moral education and for certain common generalizations about ingratitude that have been put 
forward by philosophers.  
 
Response-Gratitude and Appreciation 
 
Gratitude as a virtue is rightly (if vaguely) analyzed as the disposition to manifest the right kind 
and degree of gratitude in all (and only) situations in which it is called for. In order to understand 
the virtue of gratitude, then, we first need to understand the circumstances that call for gratitude 
and what it means for a beneficiary to be properly grateful in any given circumstance of that 
kind. In doing so, we must be careful not to let ordinary usage of gratitude terms lead us astray, 
because ordinary usage belies an important conceptual distinction.2 We sometimes use gratitude 
terms (“grateful,” “thankful,” etc.) to convey or describe appreciation, as is typically done when 
such terms are followed by the word that and a proposition. Utterances like “I am grateful that 
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the weather was beautiful on my wedding day,” “I am grateful that the police officer was 
distracted as I sped by her cruiser,” and “I am grateful that my mother’s cancer went into 
remission” all express appreciation. Appreciation is properly a response to beneficial states of 
affairs or states of affairs one finds valuable, and this response is constituted by certain cognitive 
elements (a recognition of the value of the thing being appreciated) and certain affective elements 
(a tendency to take pleasure or enjoy the state of affairs being appreciated). Part of what it is to be 
grateful that my mother’s cancer went into remission, for instance, is to recognize the goodness 
and the rarity of that event, to refuse to take it for granted, and to take joy in the additional life 
and health such a state of affairs allows my mother. Appreciation is not fundamentally an 
interpersonal or inter-agential phenomenon, and though it is a mode of valuing, it does not 
necessarily entail any kind of care or concern, on the part of the beneficiary, for the wellbeing of 
its object. My gratitude that the weather was beautiful on my wedding day, for instance, certainly 
does not entail a care or concern on my part for the wellbeing of the weather. 
 We express a different kind of attitude when we use gratitude terms followed by the 
preposition to, as we do in utterances like “I am grateful to a stranger for coming to my rescue,” 
“I am grateful to my mentor for all her time and attention,” and “I am grateful to my parents.” 
In contrast to gratitude that (or appreciation), gratitude to is properly a response not to good states 
of affairs, but to the benevolent attitudes and actions of our benefactors. My gratitude toward my 
mentor is fitting or called for so long (and only so long) as she seems to have been motivated by a 
genuine intrinsic desire to see me flourish. If it turned out my mentor was mentoring me only 
because she was afraid she might not receive tenure otherwise, that might very well render my 
gratitude to her unwarranted (though it may still be reasonable to be grateful that she mentored 
me, insofar as I found her mentorship beneficial). By the same token, if the police officer who let 
me speed by without ticketing me had actually seen me and, out of kindheartedness, allowed me 
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to get away without being ticketed, it seems I should be grateful to her, and not just grateful that I 
escaped without getting a ticket. 
 Gratitude to differs from gratitude that (or appreciation) in that the former entails a kind of 
concern or care for the object of the attitude. This concern or care manifests in several ways. 
Perhaps most notably, it manifests in certain feelings—namely, feelings of goodwill toward the 
benefactor.3 It would ring false, after all, for me to claim to be grateful to my mentor for giving 
me so much time and attention if I find myself with no additional goodwill toward her—no hope 
that she fares well, no tendency to be happy when I hear things are going well for her, no 
tendency to be sad when I learn that things are going poorly for her. Gratitude to also entails 
certain behaviors or behavioral dispositions. It involves, for instance, a disposition to reciprocate 
favors a benefactor has done for me, a disposition to help her should I find her in distress in the 
future, and a disposition to avoid harming her myself.4 If I find out that a stranger who once 
came to my rescue is now in need of similar rescuing, and I can rescue her with little risk to 
myself, then it seems false to say I am grateful to her if I have no motivation to help her, even if I 
bear her feelings of goodwill. Gratitude to, then, includes certain behavioral dispositions, which, 
together with feelings of goodwill, are a fundamental part of what distinguishes gratitude to from 
gratitude that, or appreciation. 
In this chapter, I will be primarily concerned with the virtue associated with gratitude to 
(which, from this point on, I will call simply “gratitude”). Though I will occasionally mention 
gratitude that for the sake of contrasting it with gratitude to, I will not be primarily concerned here 




An Elemental Analysis of Response-Gratitude 
 
Gratitude, I will take it, is properly a response to benevolence. What are the elements of the 
grateful response?—that is, what are the components of the response a beneficiary must have to 
an instance of benevolence in order to count as fully or properly grateful for it? It seems to me 
that the grateful response can be resolved into three more or less distinct but closely 
interconnected kinds of elements: cognitive elements, affective elements, and behavioral 
elements. I will consider each of these in turn.  
Cognitive elements. As a response to acts of benevolence, gratitude requires at the very least 
an accurate judgment or private recognition on the part of the beneficiary that an act of 
benevolence has occurred.5 It seems impossible, after all, that I could be grateful to my mentor for 
all her attention and advice if I am unaware or incredulous that she bore me some benevolence 
that motivated that attention and advice (though I could of course be grateful that she gave me her 
attention and advice without recognizing anything about her mental states). We would be hard 
pressed to call such a beneficiary grateful because, at the very least, a beneficiary who failed to 
judge that an act of benevolence had been performed would be unlikely to have the feelings or 
exhibit the behaviors a grateful person ought to have and perform. Such feelings and behaviors, 
after all, do not arise ex nihilo in normal people, so without accurate beliefs about an instance of 
benevolence, we would expect them not to arise. 
To count as properly grateful for a particular instance of benevolence, a beneficiary must 
recognize not only that benevolence has been demonstrated; he must also be sensitive to the 
magnitude and the scope of the benevolence being demonstrated (i.e., roughly, which interests of the 
beneficiary the benefactor had an intrinsic desire to advance and how strong that desire was). This 
means that a grateful beneficiary will be properly attuned to evidence of such benevolence—will 
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recognize such evidence, give it the weight it warrants in his deliberation, and come to reasonable 
conclusions about how much and what kind of benevolence a benefactor had for him. A properly 
grateful beneficiary will, for instance, tend to recognize the difference between a wealthy person 
who gives him a certain amount of money and a poorer person who gives him the same sum of 
money. He will also tend to recognize the difference between someone who drops money in his lap 
accidentally and someone who intentionally and thoughtfully gives him money. He will tend to 
recognize the difference between the mentor who mentors him because she genuinely cares about 
his philosophical and professional development and the mentor who mentors him only because 
she worries about receiving tenure. A beneficiary who did not make such distinctions, it seems, 
would often thereby fail to respond to the former and latter parties with different degrees of 
gratitude, as a properly grateful person should. Being properly grateful to a benefactor, then, 
consists in part of a tendency to apprehend the benefactor’s benevolence and infer its magnitude 
and scope correctly.6 
 Affective elements. As I noted in distinguishing gratitude from appreciation, an essential part 
of what it is for a beneficiary to be grateful to is to have certain feelings vis-à-vis the benefactor 
that he wouldn’t have if not for her benevolence. Some philosophers believe there is a single 
feeling of gratitude, and that what it is to be grateful to someone is to have this feeling concerning 
them and their benevolence.7 This, however, is a mistake. It is true that often when we first 
become aware of someone’s benevolence toward us, we experience a positive feeling; but this 
positive feeling is more accurately understood as part of appreciating the fact that someone has 
benefited us. This pleasant feeling is not always called for in response to acts of benevolence qua 
acts of benevolence.8 And indeed, it seems plausible that being grateful in a particular moment 
need not entail having any feelings at all toward a benefactor in that moment. I am, for example, 
grateful to people for things they did for me years ago, even though there are long stretches of 
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time during which I do not have any feelings regarding them. What makes me grateful during 
such stretches is my disposition to feel certain things regarding them when I am reminded of them. 
In particular, part of what makes me grateful to past benefactors is that when I hear of them and 
learn they are doing well, I experience positive feelings of joy or satisfaction, and when I hear 
that they are doing poorly, I experience negative feelings of sadness or grief. When it comes to 
feelings, then, what it means to be grateful is to be disposed to be happy when things go well for a 
benefactor and disposed to be upset or sad when things go poorly for her. This is the affective 
disposition I referred to as goodwill in the previous section. 
As with the cognitive elements of the grateful response, the affective elements should be 
proportional to the benevolence shown to the beneficiary by the benefactor. That is, the 
magnitude, intensity and duration of the feelings of goodwill I am disposed to experience vis-à-vis 
a benefactor of mine should be proportional to the benevolence my benefactor has shown me. A 
properly grateful beneficiary should, all else equal, experience stronger feelings of happiness 
when he hears of the flourishing of a benefactor who showed him a great deal of benevolence 
than when he hears of the flourishing of a benefactor who showed him only a mild amount of 
benevolence. And if a beneficiary discovers evidence that his benefactor was more benevolent 
toward him than he originally believed, this realization should result in an increase in the amount 
of pleasure he takes in learning of her flourishing. So too, mutatis mutandis, for the feelings of grief 
or upset he would experience upon learning of such benefactors’ misfortunes. 
 Behavioral elements. As I noted in the previous section, it seems that certain behaviors or 
behavioral dispositions are also an essential part of the grateful response. After all, a beneficiary 
who recognized his benefactor’s benevolence and developed an affective disposition of goodwill 
toward her would still seem to fall short of gratitude if he found himself, despite those beliefs and 
feelings, completely unmotivated to return a favor or help her out in some way. Typically, the 
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sorts of behaviors we expect to see from a grateful beneficiary include returning a favor, coming 
to the aid of the benefactor if she is in trouble (especially if she requests help), taking care to avoid 
harming her,9 and using the gift or benefit she conferred in a way that is consistent with her 
reasonable hopes for how it should be used.10 This is not to say that all or even any of these 
behaviors is necessary for gratitude. After all, a beneficiary may be grateful but never have the 
opportunity to carry out any of these behaviors. What would make the difference between a 
grateful beneficiary and an ungrateful one in such cases, it seems, is whether the beneficiary has 
the disposition to do these things should the opportunity arise. As far as grateful behaviors go, then, 
we can say that gratitude entails not certain behaviors, but certain behavioral dispositions 
concerning the benefactor. Specifically, it entails grateful beneficence (a heightened disposition to 
benefit a benefactor) and grateful nonmaleficence (a heightened disposition to avoid harming a 
benefactor).  
As with the cognitive and affective elements of the grateful response, the behavioral 
elements of the grateful response should be proportional to the benevolence shown to the 
beneficiary by the benefactor. That is, the degree to which a beneficiary is disposed to exert 
effort, expend resources, incur risk and suffer harm to benefit a benefactor should be 
proportional to the benevolence the benefactor showed him. A properly grateful beneficiary 
should, all else equal, be willing to do more to help or return a favor to a benefactor who showed 
great benevolence than one who showed only minor benevolence. And if a beneficiary discovers 
evidence that his benefactor was more benevolent toward him than he originally believed, this 
realization should result in an increase in what he would be willing to do to help or refrain from 
harming her.  
 To count as properly grateful, a beneficiary must not only be disposed to act in the proper 
beneficent and nonmaleficent ways, but he must be disposed to do so for the right reasons as 
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well. After all, a beneficiary who is disposed to help a benefactor but only for prudential reasons 
(e.g., to keep her benevolence flowing or to avoid getting a bad reputation) seems to fall short of 
gratitude.11 Grateful beneficiaries must be motivated by the ultimate goal of seeing their 
benefactors fare well. They should take the fact that some action will benefit a benefactor to be, 
more or less by itself, a good reason to act in such a way, and they should be motivated to act in 
light of such reasons.  
 Thanking. A final aspect of gratitude worth noting is the practice of thanking. Thanking is 
clearly a crucial part of a grateful response, in the sense that a beneficiary who fails to thank a 
benefactor might very well be the clearest instance of an ingrate. Interestingly, thanking cannot 
be easily classified as one of the three kinds of elements (cognitive, affective or behavioral) I have 
outlined above. Some might be tempted to classify thanking as a kind of cognitive element, 
especially when thanking is understood to serve the function of reporting a beneficiary’s belief 
that a benevolent act has occurred. And indeed, in order to be sincere, it seems that a 
beneficiary’s thanking must be backed by the right beliefs. But thanking is clearly more than 
merely forming (or even reporting) a private judgment. After all, even when a beneficiary knows 
that his benefactor knows he’s grateful, it seems he still ought to express his gratitude to her by 
thanking her. Some might be tempted to see thanking as a manifestation of the affective elements 
of gratitude, insofar as thanking often takes the form of a spontaneous expressive outpouring of 
the feelings of gratitude a grateful beneficiary should have. But thanking seems at least sometimes 
to be something other than an expressive outpouring of feelings. Indeed, there are times thanking 
seems called for, reasonable and sincere when a beneficiary is not experiencing any of the typical 
feelings of gratitude. This may happen, for instance, if a beneficiary receives a benevolent gift at a 
moment when he is preoccupied with other stronger thoughts and feelings that temporarily 
preclude him from experiencing feelings of gratitude. In such cases, thanking might still be 
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sincere if it is understood as a commitment to take up the behavioral and affective dispositions 
gratitude entails.12 It might be thought, finally, that thanking is a manifestation of beneficent 
behavioral tendencies a beneficiary should have. After all, a benefactor often has an interest in 
knowing whether her act of benevolence was received, recognized and appreciated by her 
beneficiary, and letting her know these things (by thanking her) might count as the sort of return-
beneficence a grateful beneficiary should be disposed to perform. But while thanking might 
sometimes count as a kind of benefit for the benefactor, this isn’t true of thanking in all cases. 
There are times, for instance, when benefactors do not want or enjoy or have an interest in being 
thanked, and times when benefactors might come to know from third parties all they might want 
to know about how their benevolence was received; yet even in such cases, thanking seems called 
for.13 
One possible explanation for all this is that thanking is its own element, distinct from the 
cognitive, affective and behavioral elements of the grateful response I have outlined. Another 
possibility, though, and one I find more plausible, is that thanking can play a variety of roles, any 
one of which can be reduced to the three elements I detailed above. If this were true, a 
beneficiary’s failure to thank could always be traced back to a shortfall in one of these three 
elements. And that seems plausible enough. After all, it is difficult to imagine a beneficiary who 
shows the proper cognitive, affective and behavioral responses toward a benevolent benefactor 
but nevertheless reprehensibly fails to thank her. This entails that there is no need to posit 
thanking as a fourth distinct element of the grateful response and that the grateful response can 
be fully specified in terms of cognitive, affective and behavioral elements. Though a full argument 
for this position is outside the scope of this chapter, I will proceed on the premise that although 
thanking (or at least a disposition to thank) is necessary for being grateful, thanking is not a 
distinct element of the grateful response. 
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 The grateful response, then, is a complex of interrelated cognitive, affective and 
behavioral elements. More specifically, a grateful beneficiary is one who, in response to an act of 
benevolence from a benefactor, forms certain beliefs about that benefactor and her benevolence, 
forms an affective disposition of goodwill toward her, and forms dispositions of grateful 
beneficence and nonmaleficence toward her. Out of these dispositions, he should also be 
disposed to thank his benefactor. 
 
The Virtue of Gratitude 
 
As my analysis of response-gratitude shows, gratitude to a benefactor for something she’s 
done is best understood not as a feeling or as an emotional episode or as a behavior, but as a set 
of interconnected cognitive, affective and behavioral dispositions. If the virtue of gratitude is the 
disposition to consistently form properly grateful responses to acts of benevolence, and the 
properly grateful response to an act of benevolence is a complex of dispositions, then the virtue of 
gratitude is what we might call a meta-disposition: a disposition to consistently form the right 
cognitive, behavioral and affective dispositions in response to the right kinds of events (instances 
of benevolence), at the right times, to the right degrees. A grateful person, then, is one who is 
attuned to evidence of benevolence being shown toward him, reliably recognizes this 
benevolence, and consequently forms dispositions to think and feel and behave in properly 
grateful ways regarding his benefactors.  
This account of the virtue of gratitude has several features worth noting. In the first place, 
it is compatible with the possibility of obligations of gratitude.14 To say that there are obligations 
of gratitude is to say that certain called-for grateful behaviors or refrainings, like returning a favor 
or rescuing a benefactor or going out of one’s way to refrain from harming a benefactor, are 
 12 
moral obligations. To say they are moral obligations is to say that such behaviors or refrainings 
are justified by moral reasons of a certain priority and stringency, that the beneficiary has little or 
no latitude in deciding to behave in such ways on certain occasions, and that failing to behave in 
such ways on those occasions without excuse is not just lousy or non-ideal but morally wrong.15 If 
there are obligations of gratitude, then a grateful beneficiary should recognize all those features of 
such obligatory grateful actions and refrainings and be inclined to act or refrain from acting in 
light of them. On my view, a virtuous beneficiary is someone who is disposed to do just that. A 
virtuously grateful beneficiary is one who is disposed, in practical reasoning, to take the fact that 
an action of his will benefit or protect a benefactor to constitute a reason to perform that action. 
If such an action is obligatory, then an ideal and virtuous beneficiary will be disposed to perceive 
the strength, priority and stringency of that reason accurately. Of course, a grateful beneficiary 
usually will benefit or avoid harming a benefactor spontaneously, from natural inclination, 
without any conscious deliberation. This is because a grateful beneficiary will also wish his 
benefactor well, and this affective component of his gratitude may tend to motivate grateful 
beneficence and nonmaleficence prior to any deliberation.16 But in circumstances when this 
natural inclination is overwhelmed (e.g., in cases where coming to a benefactor’s aid will be 
difficult or unpleasant or will conflict with another of the beneficiary’s commitments or moral 
obligations), a virtuously grateful beneficiary will still be disposed to recognize and acknowledge 
that helping or refraining from harming a benefactor is sometimes something he in some sense 
must do. And in these circumstances, this disposition is what will lead a virtuous beneficiary to act 
gratefully—perhaps not spontaneously, but from a sense of duty.  
The second feature of my account worth noting is that it can be adapted to describe what 
it means to be grateful in contexts of varying degrees of specificity. A person who is grateful to his 
parents, for instance, is one who is inclined to recognize and respond with the appropriate 
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dispositions to benevolence from his parents, but not necessarily from other benefactors. A 
person described as grateful to strangers is one who is inclined to recognize and respond with the 
appropriate dispositions to benevolence from strangers, but not necessarily to benevolence from 
those he knows well. A person described as grateful for advice is one who is inclined to recognize 
the benevolence implied by the giving of thoughtful advice, but not necessarily other 
manifestations of benevolence. In these and other ways, my account of the virtue of gratitude can 
be adapted to describe not only the global character trait of gratitude but more local, fine-
grained grateful dispositions as well.  
Finally, my account of the virtue of gratitude can serve as a basis for a systematic 
exploration of the ways in which beneficiaries can fail to be grateful to benefactors and the vices 
these failures might constitute. It is to that exploration I now turn.  
 
Ways to Fail to Be Grateful 
 
There are three kinds of ways a beneficiary can fail to be properly grateful for an act of 
benevolence: he can fail to be properly attuned to evidence that an act of benevolence has 
occurred; he can fail to establish the proper grateful dispositions when gratitude is called for; and 
he can fail to preserve those dispositions for a proper or reasonable amount of time after the 
initial act of benevolence. I will consider each of these kinds of failure in turn.  
 Failures of attunement. Beneficiaries can fall short of gratitude, in the first place, by failing to 
notice whether gratitude is called for in a certain situation. We can imagine a beneficiary who 
believes that benevolence should be met with gratitude and who typically reacts with thanks, 
goodwill and beneficent dispositions when he perceives that benevolence has been shown to him, 
but who nonetheless often fails to notice such evidence, even in conditions when he should notice 
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it. When people benefit him, he is all too rarely left with the impression that they did so 
benevolently. Because he sometimes overlooks evidence of benevolence, such a person will not 
always respond with the proper grateful dispositions when gratitude is called for, and so he fails 
to qualify as fully or properly grateful. A person who displays such a failing once in a while is 
guilty of what we might call ungrateful insensitivity. When insensitivity is a recurring aspect of a 
person’s character, we can say such a person manifests the vice of ungrateful insensitivity.17 
 We can view the vice of ungrateful insensitivity as a kind of deficiency—a shortfall in the 
sort of sensitivity necessary to count as fully and properly grateful. If just the right amount of this 
sensitivity is a component of the virtue of gratitude, and a deficiency in this sensitivity is a vice, 
what should we make of an excess of this sort of sensitivity? A person who demonstrates this 
excess—what we might call oversensitivity—is a person who either exaggerates the significance of 
evidence of benevolence so as to perceive more benevolence from a benefactor than is likely 
really there, or, in the extreme case, mistakenly takes certain features of a situation as evidence of 
benevolence when there is no benevolence at all. An oversensitive person might, for instance, be 
left with the impression that a coworker cares more about him than she really does when she 
gives him a mundane gift during a mandatory holiday gift exchange. Oversensitivity might also 
be ascribed to someone who is left with the impression that an apple tree bears him benevolence 
when an apple falls into his lap as he sits under the tree.  
Is such oversensitivity a vice? Some might argue that it is simply on the grounds that 
oversensitivity is more than—and therefore, different from—the right amount of sensitivity we 
would expect from a grateful person.18 And oversensitivity also seems, almost by definition, to 
render someone confused or “foolish.”19 But there are several reasons to think that oversensitivity 
is vicious or morally problematic in a deeper sense. The first is that an oversensitive person is 
liable, in virtue of that oversensitivity, to be distracted by morally insignificant, gratitude-
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irrelevant features of situations, and will therefore be less likely to notice gratitude-relevant 
features of situations that are important to recognize. An illustrative parallel can be found in the 
virtue of hospitality. A genuinely hospitable person is one who is properly sensitive to evidence of 
his guests’ discomfort. To be insensitive to such evidence obviously makes one an imperfect host, 
since such insensitivity would lead to a lack of hospitable feelings and behavior when those are 
called for. But oversensitivity in this case is also a problem for a host, since it might lead him to 
be so distracted by minor or false signs of guest discomfort that he misses substantial genuine 
signs that he should note and act on. By the same token, an oversensitive beneficiary might get so 
distracted or overwhelmed attending to irrelevant features of a situation that he may sometimes 
overlook genuine evidence of benevolence. That will make it less likely that he will establish the 
beliefs and behavioral and affective dispositions that constitute gratitude toward those who 
genuinely deserve it.  
Grateful oversensitivity may also be morally problematic to the extent that it leads a 
beneficiary to establish settled beliefs, affective dispositions and behavioral dispositions vis-à-vis a 
benefactor that are out of proportion to what that benefactor actually warrants. This is a 
possibility I will return to shortly.  
Failure to establish proper dispositions: deficiencies. Even if a beneficiary is properly attuned to 
evidence of benevolence (and especially if he is not), he can fall short of gratitude if he fails to 
form settled beliefs and establish long-term properly grateful dispositions in response to such 
benevolence. Some might think that the establishment of settled beliefs and long-lasting affective 
and behavioral dispositions that constitute a virtuous response to some stimulus follows 
necessarily from proper sensitivity to that stimulus. But this isn’t necessarily true. The existence of 
manipulative psychopaths, for instance, seems to show that it is possible to be highly attuned to 
evidence that others are suffering without actually experiencing genuine compassion. And many 
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non-psychopaths are properly sensitive to evidence of suffering, in that they recognize it and 
respond in the moment with virtuous-seeming reactions, even though those reactions fail to 
endure for more than a few moments. It is not uncommon, for instance, for television viewers to 
be momentarily captivated by images of abused and neglected animals in a commercial and then 
forget those animals moments later, thus never forming the longer-term dispositions to feel for 
and help such animals that a genuinely compassionate person should have. By the same token, a 
beneficiary might be properly attuned to evidence of benevolence, and thereby get the accurate 
impression that gratitude is called for in a particular instance, but fail to see that initial 
impression solidify into the settled, long-term beliefs and lasting affective and behavioral 
dispositions constitutive of genuine gratitude.  
The most obvious form this failure can take is ingratitude—a failure to establish one or 
more of the elements of the grateful response to a sufficient magnitude when a grateful response 
is called for.20 Typically, a beneficiary who is ungrateful to a benefactor is one who fails to form a 
settled belief that the benefactor was as benevolent and deserving of gratitude as the evidence 
available to him should lead him to believe. He is someone who does not form a settled 
disposition to wish his benefactor well with sufficient intensity, someone who fails to form a 
settled disposition to be sufficiently motivated to benefit his benefactor in the future. Typically, 
because the cognitive, affective and behavioral elements of the grateful response are 
interconnected, someone who is ungrateful will show a shortfall in all three kinds of elements. But 
it is worth noting that a beneficiary can, at least theoretically, be guilty of ingratitude vis-à-vis 
certain elements of the grateful response but not others. We could imagine, for instance, a 
beneficiary who forms settled accurate beliefs about how much benevolence his benefactor 
showed and forms a settled proportional affective disposition of goodwill, but finds himself not 
sufficiently motivated to come to his benefactor’s aide when the situation calls for it. Such a 
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person, we might say, is guilty of motivational or behavioral ingratitude, but not total ingratitude. In 
any event, when a person’s settled beliefs and dispositions fall short along at least one of these 
dimensions, he is guilty of ingratitude; and when such a person habitually falls short along at least 
one of these dimensions, he manifests the vice of ingratitude.  
Three categories of ingratitude are worth distinguishing.21 The first kind of ingratitude 
occurs when a beneficiary responds with some settled belief in a benefactor’s benevolence, some 
enduring affective disposition of goodwill and some lasting increase in beneficent tendencies 
toward the benefactor, but the magnitude of these elements falls short of what would be justified 
by the benefactor’s benevolence. We can call this stripe of ingratitude sub-gratitude. Another kind 
of ingratitude is one in which a beneficiary notices that benevolence has been done but finds 
himself completely indifferent; he shows no increase at all in affective goodwill or grateful 
beneficence toward the benefactor, and perhaps forms no intermediate- or long-term memory of 
his benefactor’s benevolence. We can call this kind of ingratitude non-gratitude. A third kind of 
ingratitude involves cases in which a beneficiary responds to evidence of a benefactor’s 
benevolence with resentment, ill-will and hostility. We can imagine, for instance, a beneficiary 
who accurately perceives a benefactor’s benevolence and, because he envies that benefactor’s 
moral goodness, comes to resent her—comes to hope she fares poorly in the future, rejoices in 
her suffering to some degree, and perhaps even goes out of his way to set back her interests. We 
can call this especially devilish form of ingratitude anti-gratitude. Again, each of these species of 
ingratitude could theoretically manifest in only one or two elements of the grateful response, and 
any one of these species of ingratitude, should it become habitual or regular for a beneficiary, 
would qualify as a vice—the vice of sub-gratitude, the vice of non-gratitude, and the vice of anti-
gratitude respectively.  
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Failure to establish proper dispositions: excesses. Just as a beneficiary’s response to benevolence 
can fall short of what an act of benevolence calls for, a beneficiary’s response can also exceed that 
which an act of benevolence calls for.22 The cognitive element of such an excessive response 
would be an unjustified belief that the benefactor bears more benevolence toward the 
beneficiary—that she is more willing to sacrifice for the beneficiary, that she cares more about 
the beneficiary—than she actually does. The affective element of an excessive response would be 
an outsized affective disposition of goodwill toward her—a disposition to be too ecstatic when 
things go well for the benefactor and too upset or devastated when things go poorly for her 
relative to what her benevolence justifies. The behavioral element of an excessive response would 
be an outsized tendency to benefit or refrain from harming the benefactor—a willingness or 
tendency to sacrifice too much for a benefactor relative to her own initial benevolence. Such an 
excessive response will also typically be associated with overly enthusiastic or extravagant 
thanking. As with oversensitivity, overgratitude can occur when a person responds gratefully 
toward something that is incapable of benevolence—for instance, an apple tree. As with 
ingratitude, overgratitude can theoretically manifest in only one or two of the elements of the 
grateful response. A beneficiary could, for example, overestimate how much the benefactor cared 
about him, but then coincidentally respond with just the right amount of affective goodwill and 
beneficence. But in reality, because the cognitive, affective and behavioral aspects of gratitude are 
interconnected, most beneficiaries will likely show excesses along all or none of the elements of 
the grateful response, at least in any given instance of a particular response to a particular 
moment of benevolence from a benefactor. When a beneficiary reacts with an excess in one or 
more of the elements of the grateful response, we can say he was overgrateful to the benefactor for 
that benefit. And a person who is habitually or regularly overgrateful, we can say, manifests the 
trait of overgratitude.23  
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In what sense, if any, is overgratitude a vice? Like oversensitivity, overgratitude is vicious 
in the formal sense that it is a failure to achieve just the right amount of a virtuous disposition. 
Some think these excesses, though perhaps “foolish,” are not moral shortcomings in the sense 
that makes their bearer a less-than-ideal moral agent.24 There are several reasons, however, to 
believe that overgratitude can be morally problematic, not merely foolish. For example, 
overgratitude, especially when fueled by grateful oversensitivity, can lead to an inaccurate sense 
of self-worth. This can happen in several ways. Imagine a person who goes around the world 
perceiving evidence of benevolence toward him far more often than is warranted. Over time, 
such a person would come to believe that he was cared-about and wished-well far more widely 
than he actually was. Such a person might come to develop the morally problematic belief that 
he is more special, more cared-about, and more to-be-cared-about than he really is, and this 
condition comes very close to the definition of arrogance.25 
 Under other circumstances, overgratitude can lead a person to a kind of servility—the 
very opposite of arrogance. Imagine a beneficiary who habitually believes that his benefactors’ 
benevolence toward him is more than it really is, or more than he has any evidence to believe it 
is. If he judges his own benevolence accurately, such a beneficiary might systematically 
underestimate his own benevolence vis-à-vis that of others. Insofar as it is morally good and 
praiseworthy to be benevolent, then, and insofar as self-appraisal is in some ways tied to 
comparisons with others, an overgrateful beneficiary might wind up with a lower appraisal of his 
character and actions than he ought to have. 
Overgrateful beliefs can lead to servility within intimate relationships as well. Imagine an 
overgrateful person in an abusive relationship who, despite frequently being treated with 
disregard or contempt, comes to believe his partner bears him great benevolence.26 Despite a 
scarcity of evidence, he persuades himself that the cruel things his partner says to him are 
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intended to benefit him, are said and done out of care for him. Such a person is likely to think 
better of his partner and remain in such a relationship longer than he should—and longer than 
any virtuously self-respecting person would—at least in part because of the benevolence he 
mistakenly attributes to his partner.  
Judgments aside, overgrateful affective and behavioral responses could also amount to a 
kind of servility when they lead a beneficiary to commit more emotional and behavioral 
resources to others than they deserve. An overgrateful beneficiary is one who spends more time 
worrying about others—more time feeling upset and sad when they suffer, for instance—than he 
should. He is also someone who spends more time and energy going out of his way to benefit his 
benefactors than he should. And the more time he spends worrying about others, and the more 
time and resources he spends doing things to benefit others, the less time, energy and resources 
he has to dedicate to himself and his own projects. A sufficiently overgrateful beneficiary will not 
have enough time or resources to treat his own interests with the care and attention proper self-
respect would require, and in that sense, overgratitude can amount to a vice. 
Overgratitude is also morally dangerous for another reason: It can lead a person to 
incorrectly rank his moral priorities. This can happen if a beneficiary is prone to show differential 
overgratitude—that is, overgratitude to certain entities but properly proportioned gratitude to 
others. A person who mistakenly believes he owes gratitude to an apple tree for giving him its 
apples when he was starving, for instance, might be more inclined to protect that tree or come to 
its aid than to help a human benefactor who intentionally and benevolently provided him with a 
benefit of lesser value; and if such a beneficiary finds himself in a position where he has to choose 
between helping the tree and helping his human benefactor, his overgratitude would lead him to 
make the wrong choice. Overgratitude can thus lead to problems with ordinal gratitude 
judgments and actions. It can also lead to problems prioritizing moral actions more generally. 
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Consider again an overgrateful person who has an outsized motivation to protect an apple tree 
he thinks showed him benevolence. If his motivation to protect the tree on a particular occasion 
conflicts with his motivation to keep a promise, he might be inclined to protect the tree rather 
than keep the promise, and in that way, his overgratitude would keep him from acting as he 
morally should.  
Failures of duration. A final category of gratitude-associated vices comes to light when we 
note that even if a beneficiary accurately perceives benevolence and establishes the proper 
cognitive, affective and behavioral dispositions, those dispositions might nonetheless fail to 
endure as long as they should. The beneficiary of a monumental act of benevolence might, for 
instance, recognize a benefactor’s benevolence and thank her and form accurate judgments and 
proportional affective and behavioral dispositions but forget about the act of benevolence after a 
few days. Alternatively, he may remember the benevolence but may find that his motivation to 
come to his benefactor’s aid or his feelings in wishing his benefactor well wane too quickly over 
time. Insofar as the grateful disposition should endure for some period of time, such a beneficiary 
falls short of gratitude, and he thereby manifests what we might call evanescent gratitude. When a 
beneficiary is habitually evanescently grateful, we can say he manifests the vice of gratitude 
evanescence.   
If we take evanescent gratitude to be a deficiency (a deficiency in the durability of the 
grateful dispositions), we might wonder whether there is an associated excess: a grateful 
disposition that endures too long. One might think that an ideally grateful person will remember 
an act of benevolence and be disposed to respond with the right feelings and behaviors indefinitely, 
even if this is a psychological impossibility for any actual human beneficiary.27 But perhaps it is 
ideal that our memories of benevolence and our affective and behavioral dispositions concerning 
our benefactors’ welfare fade somewhat over time. This fading may mirror the changes our 
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benefactors go through over time, changes that eventually make them different people from the 
ones who earned our gratitude in the first place. Imagine a benefactor who showed someone 
genuine benevolence when she was twenty, but then over subsequent decades became 
hardhearted and uncaring to the point where she would no longer perform the same kind of act 
of benevolence for the same person under the same circumstances. When her beneficiary 
encounters her fifty years later, there seems to be a sense in which the benefactor as she is at 70 
no longer deserves the gratitude she did when she was twenty. For the beneficiary to show her 
now exactly the same gratitude he owed her decades ago for things she decades ago did might 
thus seem to be a sort of misfiring, not unlike grateful oversensitivity or overgratitude. Insofar as 
grateful dispositions can persist too long, we can think of them as constituting overpersistent gratitude, 
and a person whose gratitude is habitually overpersistent we might say suffers from the vice of 
gratitude overpersistence.  
 
Conclusion   
 
My goal in this chapter has been to sketch an account of the virtue of gratitude and to 
explore the range of vices associated with that virtue. On my account, the virtue of gratitude is 
best understood as the disposition to form and sustain a properly grateful response to the right 
people at the right times and to the right degree. The grateful response itself is at its core a 
complex of dispositions that includes beliefs about the benefactor, an affective disposition of 
goodwill, and behavioral dispositions of grateful beneficence and nonmaleficence. Gratitude as a 
virtue, then, is essentially a meta-disposition: specifically, the disposition to perceive benevolence 
and to form the proper grateful beliefs and affective and behavioral dispositions vis-à-vis the 
source of that benevolence. If this is the right way to construe the virtue of gratitude, I argued, 
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then there are three kinds of ways a beneficiary can fail to be properly grateful: he can fail to be 
properly sensitive to evidence of benevolence (failures of attunement); he can fail to establish the 
proper beliefs and dispositions when gratitude is called for (failures of establishment); and he can 
fail to preserve those beliefs and dispositions for a proper or reasonable amount of time (failures 
of duration). These categories of failure can be divided into deficiencies and excesses. The 
deficiency-failure of attunement is insensitivity—an insensitivity to evidence of benevolence and a 
failure to perceive that an act of benevolence has occurred. The excess-failure of attunement is 
oversensitivity—perceiving a certain amount of benevolence where no (or less) benevolence has 
been evidenced. The deficiency-failure of establishment is ingratitude, which can be subdivided 
into sub-gratitude, non-gratitude and anti-gratitude. The excess-failure of establishment is 
overgratitude, which occurs when the magnitude of the cognitive, affective and behavioral 
elements of the grateful response are outsized compared to the benevolence to which they are a 
response, or when such elements arise in response to no benevolence at all. Finally, failures of 
duration occur when a beneficiary fails to sustain a proper grateful disposition toward a 
benefactor over time. The deficiency-failure of duration is evanescent gratitude, and it is unclear 
whether there is an associated excess-failure—i.e., whether there is such a thing as overpersistent 
gratitude. Failures of establishment and failures of duration can be further specified by the 
particular element(s) of the grateful response in which the failure occurs. When a person finds he 
fails in any of these ways habitually or regularly as a beneficiary, this habit or regularity amounts 
to a vice that can be ascribed to that person.28 
If what I have said is correct, then there is a rich variety of ways in which a person can 
habitually fail to be grateful, and attending to this variety of gratitude-associated vices is 
important for several reasons. It may, for instance, be useful in the process of moral education. 
When we want to help a child develop into a properly grateful person, it helps to know exactly 
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how that particular child tends to stray from the properly grateful disposition. A child who shows 
insensitivity, for example, is one who needs to be taught to look out for and recognize the 
evidence that others are being benevolent toward him. A child who shows anti-grateful 
tendencies, on the other hand, may be keenly sensitive to evidence of the benevolence of others, 
but he may need to be taught not to envy this benevolence (and should instead, perhaps, be 
encouraged to match this benevolence with his own). A child who shows good sensitivity and 
decent affective gratitude but behavioral sub-grateful tendencies needs to be taught that 
recognition and feelings alone are not enough for gratitude, and he should be approached and 
coached the same way a goodhearted but lazy child might be. Importantly, moral educators 
should not assume that just because a child shows no ungrateful tendencies he needs no moral 
guidance as far as gratitude goes. Educators should keep an eye out for children who show 
tendencies toward oversensitivity and overgratitude, making sure such children develop proper 
levels of self-respect; and educators should avoid urging everyone to instantiate as much 
gratitude-constitutive behavior and feeling as possible as much of the time as possible.29  
Recognizing the variety of ways in which a beneficiary can fail to be grateful also helps us 
make and communicate more fine-grained judgments of those who demonstrate vicious 
ingratitude. It gives us the language and the concepts, for instance, to distinguish between anti-
grates and sub-grates. A sub-grate is someone who bears his benefactor goodwill and treats her 
with beneficence but does not quite demonstrate enough of each to count as fully grateful. An 
anti-grate, by contrast, is someone who comes to resent his benefactors. Both are rightly called 
ingrates, but the ramifications of doing favors for one rather than the other are quite different: in 
particular, doing a favor for an anti-grate may actually endanger the benefactor in a way that 
doing a favor for a sub-grate would not, since anti-grates respond to benevolence with envy and 
resentment. Distinguishing these two types of beneficiaries is thus important for us to be able to 
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do when we pass along information to others, and it is something we cannot do effectively if we 
classify both types of beneficiaries simply as ingrates. 
 The ability to make these more fine-grained distinctions is helpful not only practically, in 
our interactions with others, but also theoretically, in the scholarly study of gratitude. It helps us 
qualify certain widespread generalizations about ingratitude, for instance, that are not strictly 
speaking accurate—or, at least, not as generally apt as they purport to be. Consider, for example, 
the claim that ingratitude is among the worst of the moral vices. Hume endorsed this view, 
writing that “Of all crimes that human creatures are capable of committing, the most horrid and 
unnatural is ingratitude…”30 Kant considered ingratitude (along with envy and malice) “the 
essence of vileness and wickedness.”31 And Seneca ranked ingrates below thieves and 
adulterers.32 These claims do not seem wildly implausible so long as we take anti-gratitude to be 
representative of ingratitude generally. But they seem far less plausible when said of a mere sub-
grate. The moral of the story is that because ingratitude is heterogeneous, philosophers would be 
wiser to make generalizations about species of ingratitude than about ingratitude tout court. My 









1 For the sake of clarity, throughout this chapter I will refer to beneficiaries with masculine pronouns and 
benefactors with feminine pronouns.  
2 I make this distinction in Manela, 2016a. 
3 Those who point this out include Walker, 1980-1981; Manela, 2016b. 
4 Manela, 2015b; Manela, 2016a. 
5 This goes without saying for those in certain linguistic traditions. For instance, the French word for 
“grateful”, reconnaissant, is derived from the verb reconnaître, “to recognize”. And this insight is not lost on 
philosophers of gratitude in the Anglophone community. As Fred Berger notes, gratitude “involves at least 
the recognition of the other’s having done something” that qualifies as an act of benevolence. (Berger, 
1975: 302) See also Walker, 1980-1981. 
6 There may, of course, be occasions on which a beneficiary sees no direct evidence of a benefactor’s 
motivations. In some such cases, it may be perfectly consistent with proper gratitude to give a benefactor 
the benefit of the doubt that her motives are benevolent, not selfish. In other contexts, being so generous 
with the benefit of the doubt may not be warranted—especially when and if there is positive evidence the 
benefactor was not being benevolent. 
7 See, for instance, Fitzgerald, 1998; Costello, 2009. 
8 Positive feelings are not called for, for instance, in cases where the benefactor suffers terribly in 
benefitting the beneficiary, or in cases where a clumsy would-be benefactor is likely to cause the 
beneficiary more harm than good, or in cases where a benefactor wants to benefit the beneficiary in a way 
the beneficiary ashamedly realizes he does not deserve, or in cases where an especially self-abnegating 
benefactor is willing to accept grossly disproportionate sacrifices on her part for modest gains to the 
beneficiary. Some such cases may warrant praise or gratitude to the benefactor, but it seems plausible to 
say that a beneficiary need not appreciate such instances of benevolence, insofar as the beneficiary might 
prefer a state of affairs in which such benevolence hadn’t existed at all. At any rate, it seems true that 
positive feelings of joy aren’t called for in such circumstances. 
9 Manela, 2015b; Walker, 1980-1981. 
10 Camenisch, 1981. 
11 McConnell, 1993. 
12  Such cases are instances of what Camenisch (1981, 7) calls the “commissive” sense of thanking.  
13 Except, perhaps, for the unusual sort of case in which a benefactor has an interest in not being thanked 
or in not knowing. In those cases (and perhaps only in those cases), thanking does not seem called for. For 
an interesting discussion of whether it could be reasonable for a virtuous benefactor to want not to be 
thanked, see the discussion of John Jarndyce in Robert Roberts’ contribution to this volume. 
14 Philosophers who seem to presuppose the incompatibility of a virtue of gratitude and obligations of 
gratitude include Wellman, 1999. Presupposing such an incompatibilism spells trouble for any account of 
the virtue of gratitude because there are strong arguments for the existence of obligations of gratitude (see 
Manela, 2015b: §1.). Philosophers can avoid presupposing this incompatibilism as they begin inquiries 
into gratitude if they are careful to ask what we might call the of-question (whether there are obligations of 
gratitude or a virtue of gratitude) rather than the is-question (whether gratitude is a set of obligations or a virtue), since 
the second question subtly stacks the deck against the possibility that gratitude could describe both a set of 
obligations and a virtue. For other reasons to prefer the of-question as a starting point for philosophical 
inquiry into gratitude, see Manela, 2015a: §5.  
15 For an extended discussion of a beneficiary’s obligation to go out of his way to avoid harming his 
benefactor, see Manela, 2015b: §1. 
16 This is one example of the many ways in which the affective and behavioral elements of the grateful 
response are interconnected.  
17 Of course, not every failure to notice evidence of benevolence disqualifies a beneficiary from counting 
as fully grateful. A blind person who doesn’t notice evidence of benevolence because of his blindness 
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doesn’t count as ungrateful for that. Still, it seems fair to say that certain kinds of lack of attunement to 
relevant details are enough to keep a person from counting as fully virtuous. A serial CEO who fails to 
notice time and again that 90% of the leadership positions in the companies he manages are occupied by 
men, for instance, seems to fall short of full possession of the virtue of justice, even if he is properly 
concerned, indignant, and motivated to challenge such gender imbalances whenever they are pointed out 
to him. By the same token, someone who routinely overlooks clear evidence that people are treating him 
benevolently falls short of gratitude. 
18 Nisters, 2012. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ungrateful insensitivity is especially likely to lead to this.    
21 These distinctions were originally put forward by Thomas Aquinas: II.II.107.   
22 Such excesses are especially likely to occur when a beneficiary is oversensitive to evidence of 
benevolence. 
23 This vice, also originally described by Aquinas, has been named hypergratitude by Nisters, 2012. I prefer 
the term overgratitude because that term implies too much gratitude, whereas hypergratitude is a more 
neutral term, implying only more gratitude than is normal or usual. 
24 Ibid. 
25 This is one reason it is morally problematic to anthropomorphize and feel grateful toward non-agential 
natural objects that benefit us. I make this point more fully in Manela, 2018. 
26 “Partner” here could be understood as a romantic partner, a friend, a parent, or a mentor. 
27 Of course, it seems fair to say that once a beneficiary returns a favor or otherwise performs an act of 
gratitude for a benefactor, the beneficiary should no longer have the same motivation to benefit his 
benefactor that he once did. But even after acts of gratitude are carried out, that shouldn’t alter the 
cognitive and affective components of a grateful response, which should still remain in place in a grateful 
beneficiary. That is, even after acts of gratitude are carried out, we still expect a beneficiary to remember 
the act of benevolence, and to be disposed to be pleased when he hears things are going well for his 
beneficiary and upset when he hears things are going poorly. We might even still expect him to have some 
tendency, albeit one of reduced magnitude, to look for ways to benefit his benefactor beyond what he’s 
already done. 
28 It is worth noting here that each of these vices can be more or less localized, more or less context-
specific. Just as we can make sense of a person who is grateful to his parents, for instance, we can make 
sense of someone who is sub-grateful to his parents, overgrateful to strangers, or anti-grateful to siblings as 
people who show just those failures of gratitude in just those contexts.  
29 All this, of course, applies to those interested in self-cultivation as well as moral educators charged with 
the cultivation of others. 
30 Hume, 2007: III.I.I. 
31 Kant, 1979: 218. 
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